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Much attention has focused on the impact of the current 
crisis on goods trade; hardly any on its impact on services 
trade. Using new trade data from the United States, and 
more aggregate data from other OECD countries, the 
authors show that services trade is weathering the current 
crisis much better than goods trade. As of February 2009, 
the value of US goods imports had declined year-on-
year by 33 percent and the value of goods exports by 21 
percent; services imports and exports each had declined 
by less than 7 percent. Within services, interesting 
patterns are emerging. Trade in goods-related transport 
services and crisis-related financial services has shrunk, 
as has expenditure on tourism abroad. But trade in a 
range of business, professional, and technical services is 
still increasing, with US exports growing even faster (at 
10 percent) than US imports (at 7 percent). Developing 
This paper—a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
improve our understanding of trade in services. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at iborchert@worldbank.org and amattoo@worldbank.org.
countries like India, which are relatively specialized in 
business process outsourcing and information technology 
services, have suffered much smaller declines in total 
exports to the United States than countries like Brazil 
and China and regions like Africa, which are specialized 
in exports of goods, transport services, or tourism 
services. On the basis of new evidence from Indian 
services exporters, the authors suggest that services 
trade is buoyant relative to goods trade for two reasons: 
demand for a range of traded services is less cyclical, 
and services trade and production are less dependent on 
external finance. Even though few explicitly protectionist 
measures have so far been taken in services, the changing 
political climate and the widening boundaries of the state 
in crisis countries may introduce a national bias in firms’ 
procurement and location choicesTHE CRISIS-RESILIENCE OF SERVICES TRADE 
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The current gloom and doom about goods trade has obscured the quiet resilience of services 
trade.  Services account for over one-fifth of global cross-border trade, and for some 
countries such as India and the US close to a third of all exports.  This paper uses data on 
cross-border trade in services from the United States released in March and April 2009 to 
show that while trade in goods has declined drastically, trade in some services has held up 
remarkably well (Figure 1).
1  The more aggregate data available for other OECD countries 
also suggest that services trade has suffered less from the crisis than goods trade.
2   
 
Monthly US imports and exports of goods declined by about one-third in value terms from 
peaks of $195 bn and $121 bn, respectively, in July 2008, to $122 bn and $85 bn, 
respectively, in February 2009.
 3  The corresponding decline in services imports and exports 
was only by about one-tenth, from $29 bn and $38 bn, respectively, in July 2008, to $26 bn 
and $33, respectively, in February 2009.
4   
 
Figure 1:  US Monthly Imports and Exports of Goods and Services,  
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Source: BEA, US International Trade in Goods and Services, millions of dollars, 
months seasonally adjusted. 
                                                 
1 This data also includes consumption of services abroad (in the category “travel”), but does not encompass 
sales through foreign affiliates or through the presence of foreign natural persons.  Recent data is not available 
for sales through affiliates and sales by natural persons are not properly measured (see European Commission et 
al. (2002) and Maurer et al. (2008)).  
2 The US accounts for about one-fifth of imports and exports of all OECD countries. 
3 Part of the decline in the value of goods imports could be due to the fall in commodity prices.  But note that 
US goods exports also declined over the last seven months by one-third. 
4 In February 2009, the year-on-year decline in the value of goods imports was 33 percent; the decline in the 
value of services imports was only 7 percent.  US exports present a similar picture of year-on-year declines: a 
decline in goods exports by 21 percent by February; in services exports by 6.5 percent. 
  2Within services trade, interesting patterns emerge.  Imports and exports of goods-related 
services such as international transport have shrunk in the last quarter (year-on-year by about 
one-fifth) as has expenditure on tourism abroad (by about one-tenth), while imports of other 
private services have actually grown slightly.  Within ‘other private services’, trade in 
financial services has also contracted in the last quarter (year-on-year imports by 12.5 percent 
and exports by an even higher 17 percent).   
 
But trade in a range of other services is growing, with US exports growing even faster than 
US imports.  This pattern is evident in insurance (imports by 3 percent, exports by 9 percent), 
telecommunications (imports by 2.5 percent, exports by 25 percent) and, in particular, a 
range of business, professional and technical services (imports by 7 percent and exports by 
10 percent).   
 
Overall exports to the US of developing countries which are relatively specialized in 
services, like India (38 percent share of services in total exports) have declined less than 
exports of countries and regions for which services are less important, such as Brazil (12 
percent share), China (9 pecent share) and Africa (15 percent share).  The contractions in 
their total exports (goods and services) to the United States in the fourth-quarter were:  India 
(2.5 percent), Brazil (13 percent), China (9 percent), and Africa (36 percent).  This relatively 
positive outlook is corroborated by Indian industry sources, which suggest that employment 
in the export-oriented IT and business process outsourcing services is expected to grow by 
about 5 percent (around 100,000 jobs) in 2009. 
 
Based on new evidence from Indian services exporters, we find that services trade is buoyant 
for two reasons.  First, on the supply side, services trade has been less affected by the crisis-
induced scarcity of finance.  Services trade, especially in electronically-delivered business 
services, needs trade finance less than goods trade.  When external funds are needed, e.g. for 
working capital, small and large firms tend to rely on advance payments from clients and 
their ability to raise finance against orders placed.  Moreover, receivables in business process 
outsourcing are fungible and easily factorized because they typically involve a short-term 
transaction, a buyer who is creditworthy, and disputes over the service rendered are rare.  
Generally, services-producing firms have even in normal times tended to be less dependent 
on external finance than goods production because they have limited tangible collateral.  For 
example, two of India’s largest exporters of software and business-process services, Infosys 
and Tata Consultancy Services, have no external debt at all and rely completely on retained 
earnings for their operations. 
 
Second, demand for a range of services seems to have contracted less than demand for goods.  
One reason is that services are not storable and so are less subject to the big declines in 
demand in downturns that affect durable goods like shoes and televisions.  This is because 
many services suffer neither from the “vintage effect” – i.e. the willingness to wear an older 
pair of shoes or drive an older car – nor from the “inventory effect” – i.e. the fact that cuts in 
final demand translate into bigger immediate cuts in demand for factory output because of 
inventory adjustment.  Another reason is that a larger part of international demand for 
services – e.g. outsourced back-office services - is less discretionary than demand for goods 
such as computers.  This is both because many outsourced services (e.g. book-keeping) are 
  3“necessities” for producers; demand for some of these services is unrelated to the scale of 
production; and a larger part of services trade seems to involve long-term relationships (e.g. 
because of relationship-specific investments by buyers and sellers).  There are also signs that 
the crisis is itself generating new tasks to be outsourced, such as legal process outsourcing or 
debt processing, as well as creating pressure generally to reduce costs through outsourcing.
5   
 
The relative buoyancy of services trade cannot be taken for granted.  Over it too hangs the 
Damocles sword of protectionism.  But protection is taking a subtle form, perhaps in 
deference to the invisibility of services and the fact that they are increasingly delivered 
electronically.  First, explicit discrimination through preferential procurement seems at this 
stage less damaging than the implicit social and political disapproval of outsourcing.  
Developing country service exporters argue that it is the latter that has had a chilling effect 
on demand for their services.  Similarly, the few visible explicit restrictions on employing or 
contracting foreign services providers in specific areas (e.g. financial services) are not as 
costly for both host and source as the increasing social and political aversion to immigration.  
In the longer term, subsidies to banks are probably less damaging than financial 
protectionism.  The former are temporarily necessary to ensure the stability of the financial 
system.  The latter seriously erode the case for openness.  Inducing national banks to lend 
domestically in a crisis deprives developing countries in particular of capital when they most 
need it and greatly strengthens the case for financial self-sufficiency. 
 
Section II describes the trends revealed by the US services trade data, and compares it with 
developments in other OECD countries for which more limited data is available.  Section III 
suggests reasons for the resilience of services trade, drawing upon evidence from India.  
Section IV assesses the significance of protectionist measures affecting services trade.  
Section V concludes. 
 
 
II.  SERVICES TRADE DURING THE CRISIS 
 
In this section, we consider in turn the impact on US imports - in the aggregate and from 
specific trading partners, on US exports, on US affiliates trade, and on the trade of other 
OECD countries.   
 
II.1  US Imports of Services  
 
Imports of services have proved much more resilient than imports of goods (as we saw in 
Figure 1).  The upper panel of Figure 2 presents year-on-year growth rates of goods and 
services imports, respectively, on a monthly basis between January 2006 and February 2009.  
From mid-2008 onwards, the growth of imports of both goods and services started to 
decelerate, yet the downturn in merchandise trade was sharper.  In February 2009, goods 
                                                 
5 Combinations of these factors may also lead to dynamic effects.  Say, the pressure to reduce costs during the 
crisis induces outsourcing.  Once a firm incurs sunk costs in establishing the new arrangement and relationship, 
it does not make sense to reverse the arrangement even after the crisis has passed.  The temporary shock might 
thus permanently ratchet up outsourcing activity. 
  4imports had contracted by 33 percent compared to February 2008 while services imports had 
declined by only 7 percent. 
  5Figure 2:  US Imports of Goods and Services, Shares (2008) and Year-on-Year Growth 
Rates:  (a)  Total Goods and Services (monthly) 
  (b)  Sub-Categories of Services (monthly) 







































































































Source: BEA, US International Trade in Goods and Services and US International Transactions Accounts Data, 
Tab. 3a, millions of dollars, seasonally adjusted. 
  6The contrast is even more striking when we look at the components of services imports 
(Figure 2, middle panel).  It is no surprise to see imports of transportation services turn 
sharply negative (by 20 percent) given the contraction of international freight services.  
Interestingly, of the major components of commercial services, imports of “other private 
services” are still growing, albeit moderately (2 percent).   
 
Figure 2 (bottom panel) breaks down “other private services” into its major components, 
namely financial, insurance, telecommunications, and business/professional/technical 
services.  Again not surprisingly, given the financial origins of the current crisis, imports of 
financial services have shrunk drastically (by 13 percent).  However, even in the last quarter 
of 2008, well into the crisis, growth rates of other services, i.e. telecommunications (2.5 
percent), insurance (3 percent) and business, professional and technical services (7 percent), 
are still positive.   
 
 
II.2  The Impact on US Trading Partners 
 
In general, the impact of the crisis on developing countries’ exports to the United States 
depends on the composition of their exports.
6  Figure 3 shows the relationship between the 
change in countries’ exports to the US during the crisis (i.e. between the fourth and third 
quarter of 2008) and the share of services in a country’s total exports.  The vertical axis in the 
upper panel depicts the change in the value of total exports (goods plus services) whereas the 
vertical axis in the lower panel shows the change in the growth rate of total exports.  In terms 
of both values and growth rates, exports of countries that are relatively specialized in 
services, like India (30 percent share of services in total exports to the US), have declined 
less than exports of countries and regions for which services are less important, such as 
Brazil (14 percent share), China (3 percent share) and Africa (5 percent share).
7  As the 
lower panel shows, the reductions in growth rates of their total exports (goods and services) 
to the United States in the fourth-quarter were:  India (8 percentage points), Brazil (16 
percentage points), China (26 percentage points), and Africa (35 percentage
8  points).    
                                                
 
As we have previously shown, it is in particular the category of other private services—
which includes telecommunications and business process outsourcing services and excludes 
transport and travel—in which trade has continued to grow.  In Annex 2, Figure A.5, we 
present the same analysis with a country’s share of ‘other private services’ in total exports on 
the horizontal axis.  The relationship is similar, but the slope steeper and the correlation 
weaker than in Figure 3.  The steeper slope reflects the fact that this more resilient class of 
services offers greater insulation against crisis-related reductions in exports.  The weaker 
correlation reflects the fact that these more specific services represent a smaller share in 
overall exports.   
 
 
6 For a more detailed view of country and region-level data, see Annex 2, Figure A.4 and Table A.1.   
7 For countries’ shares of services in their exports and changes in exports, see Annex. 
8 Even though it is primarily a commodity exporter, Argentina seems to have survived the fourth quarter 
contraction, but that is only because it had already suffered a significant contraction in the third quarter –
because of the decline in commodity prices.  Brazil had a similar experience. 
  7 
Figure 3:  Change in the Value and Growth Rates of Exports to the US and Share of Services 
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Source: BEA, US International Transactions Accounts Data, Tab.12: US International 
Transactions by Area, millions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted.  The slope 
coefficient in the upper graph is significant at the 2 percent level, the one in the lower 
graph at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
  8II.3  US Exports of Services 
 
The qualitative picture for United States’ services exports (Figure 4) resembles that for US 
imports (Figure 2).   
 
Like imports, exports of services have proved much more resilient than exports of goods (as 
we saw in Figure 1).  The upper panel of Figure 4 presents year-on-year growth rates of 
goods and services exports, respectively, on a monthly basis between January 2006 and 
February 2009.  From mid-2008 onwards, the growth of exports of both goods and services 
started to decelerate, but the merchandise decline was precipitous.  In February 2009, goods 
exports were 22 percent lower than in February 2008; decline of services exports amounted 
to 6.5 percent.   
 
Within services (Figure 4, middle panel), exports of transport services declined (17 percent), 
as did expenditure by foreign tourists in the US (13 percent), but exports of private services 
increased marginally (0.7 percent).  The most relevant sub-categories of other private 
services, as shown in the bottom panel, present an even starker contrast: in the last quarter 
2008, US exports of financial services have contracted significantly (17 percent), but exports 
are growing in insurance (9 percent), telecommunications (25 percent), and business, 
professional, and technical services (10 percent), respectively. 
 
 
  9Figure 4:  US Exports of Goods and Services, Shares (2008) and Year-on-Year Growth 
Rates:  (a)  Total Goods and Services (monthly) 
  (b)  Sub-Categories of Services (monthly) 
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Source: BEA, US International Trade in Goods and Services and US International Transactions Accounts Data, 
Tab. 3a, millions of dollars, seasonally adjusted. 
  10II.4  Cross-Border Trade between Affiliated Firms  
 
A significant proportion of cross-border trade takes place between affiliated firms.  Figure 5 
provides an alternative breakdown of “other private services” into payment flows associated 
with services imports from affiliates and non-affiliates respectively.
9  Over the longer term, 
the growth of intra-corporate payment flows has generally been more volatile.  This volatility 
may reflect in part the greater discretion firms normally have in reporting the value of flows 
between affiliates (in terms of both recording the flow and pricing it).    However, during the 
crisis, intra-corporate flows have continued to grow at rates of about 10 percent per annum 
whereas the growth of arms-length payments has declined in each of the past three quarters 
and is now close to zero.  The relative resilience of intra-corporate flows may reflect a 
greater sensitivity on the part of firms to maintaining employment in affiliated firms rather 
than in arms-length suppliers.   
 
Figure 5:  Payments from US Companies for Imports of Other Private Services to Affiliated 
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Source: BEA, US International Transactions Accounts Data, Table 3a: Private Services 
Transactions, breakdown by affiliation.  Millions of dollars, months seasonally adjusted. 
4th quarter 2008 preliminary data. “FA” denotes “foreign affiliate”. 
 
 
II.5  Trade of Other OECD Countries 
 
The US accounts for 17 percent of all OECD imports of services and 20 percent of all OECD 
exports of services.  How far does its experience reflect that of the OECD countries more 
generally?  Trade data for the fourth quarter of 2008 have been released by a number of other 
OECD countries as well as two non-OECD countries (Brazil and Indonesia).  These data are 
only available at an aggregate level, i.e. for services trade as a whole and not for its 
subcomponents.  Figure 6 shows for each country the quarterly growth rate of goods imports 
                                                 
9 Figure 5 does not present the time services for payments and receipts involving non-US parent companies. 
  11(on the vertical axis) and services imports (on the horizontal axis).  Both rates are negative 
for all countries – except for Japan for which the services import growth is positive.  But 
interestingly, imports of goods are contracting faster for all countries except Australia and 
Poland.  Until more detailed data become available, we can only conclude that evidence from 
other OECD countries does not contradict the picture of the relative resilience of services 
trade emerging from US data.
10 
 
Figure 6:  Growth of Goods and Services Imports of 29 OECD and 2 Non-OECD Countries, 
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Source: OECD, Balance of Payments Statistics, Trade in Services by Partner Country, 
millions of dollars, seasonally adjusted.  Iceland has been dropped. 
 
 
III.  UNDERSTANDING THE RESILIENCE:  THE EXPERIENCE OF INDIAN 
SERVICES EXPORTERS 
 
This section provides a new perspective on the crisis from the point of view of services 
exporters.  Specifically, we explore the impact of the crisis on Indian companies that export 
information technology (IT) services or IT-enabled services (ITES) (also referred to as 
business process outsourcing (BPO)). 
 
At first glance, two aspects of the current crisis do not bode well for Indian services firms’ 
prospects. First, the epicenter of the crisis, the US accounts for 51 percent of India’s services 
exports to the OECD countries, and reportedly an even larger 60% share of its exports of IT 
                                                 
10 For another assessment of OECD trade during the crisis, see Araujo and Gonnard (2009). 
  12and BPO services.
11  The U.K., also affected by the crisis, accounts for a further 21 percent 
of India’s OECD exports.  Second, from a sectoral point of view, financial services and 
insurance remain the biggest of all markets which Indian services exporters serve. 
 
However, even though the financial turmoil is clearly hurting the industry, Indian exporters 
have weathered the crisis (much) better than companies engaged in merchandise trade. 
Growth rates of sales and employment are expected to be cut in half, but this still leaves the 
sector with growth rates that would be considered buoyant in many manufacturing sectors.  
Instead of slashing jobs, the industry continues to remain a net hirer. In absolute terms, 
around 100-110,000 new jobs will be created in 2009, as compared to 223,000 in 2008.  
Since a counterfactual 160,000 jobs would conceivably have been added in the absence of 
the current crises, the employment dent left by the financial crisis amounts to about one-third 
of new job additions lost.   
 
The muted impact at the industry level does hide considerable heterogeneity at the firm level, 
in terms of size as well as business field (IT versus BPO). Moreover, uncertainty about the 
consequences for outsourcing providers of growing demand for protectionism in the US and 
elsewhere further cloud Indian exporters’ prospects.  
 
 
III.1  Impact on Demand for Services Exports 
India’s IT and ITES sector is heavily geared towards foreign markets.  In fiscal year 2008, 
roughly three-quarters (or $40bn) of the sector’s output was destined for exports.
12 The 
industry’s increasing diversification in terms of geographic base, industries served, and the 
portfolio of services offered, has to some extent cushioned against the negative demand 
shock that originated mainly from the US economy. Industry sources expect that domestic 
sales, which are currently level about $11bn and account for only a quarter of total sales, may 
compensate for the loss in export demand only to a limited extent.   
Nevertheless, as far as the IT export market is concerned, the slump in demand clearly shows 
up in export figures: while sales grew by some 24% during the first half of the fiscal year 
2008 (Apr-Sep), growth slowed down to 12% in the second half (Oct-Mar), so that overall 
growth is expected to be 16-17%.  In the ITES sector, growth in 2008 fiscal year is widely 
expected to be somewhat higher at 20-22%.  No significant growth is expected in 2009, and 
average growth over the next two years is likely to fall to around 15% - which is one-half of 
last decade’s annual average growth rate of 30%. 
                                                 
11 Even though India’s share in US services imports has more than doubled since 1999, it still accounts for less 
than 2 percent of US services imports.   
12 Estimates in this section are based on interviews with Indian industry and industry association sources and are 
not comparable with the estimates presented in Section II based on US import data.  There are significant 
differences between Indian and US estimates of India’s exports, particularly of the key category, business, 
professional and technical services (see e.g. US Government Accountability Office, 2005).  Among the reasons 
is that for this category of services the Indian data, unlike the US data, includes earnings of temporary Indian 
workers resident in the United States, exports between affiliated firms, as well as sales made to US-owned 
affiliates located outside the US. 
  13According to industry sources, two factors are contributing to the recent slow-down.  First, 
the negative demand shock is being felt particularly in the case of discretionary IT projects. 
Secondly, there has been a general mood swing against outsourcing in crisis-hit countries, 
particularly in the US, which is discussed in Section IV.   
As far as demand contraction is concerned, there are significant differences between the IT 
and the ITES subsector.  Indian exporters’ business is more severely affected in IT services, 
where about 60% of sales are of a discretionary nature, i.e. projects can be withdrawn, or not 
contracted at all, in times of economic hardship.  ITES exports are apparently much less 
discretionary, with an estimated 70-80% of business characterized as non-discretionary. 
These latter types of services exports are likely to be more insulated from negative demand 
shocks because they involve activities that must be carried on even during the current crisis.  
For instance, in health care a system upgrading project (IT) is discretionary whereas the 
processing of claims (ITES) has to continue. In banking, a project to realize end-to-end 
automation of payments (IT) is discretionary even though it might be cost saving, whereas 
transaction processing is non-discretionary.  Figure 7 depicts the growing importance of 
ITES in the sector’s overall export performance. 
 





























Source: Reserve Bank of India, Monthly Bulletin March 2009, and National Association of Software 
and Service Companies (NASSCOM).  Time periods are fiscal years which start in April. 
 
Another reason for IT to be affected differently from ITES is because of differences between 
the two segments in the types of contractual relations.  In IT, only about 25% of foreign trade 
takes place between captives (i.e. affiliates) and their parents, whereas in ITES this share 
stands at some 40-45%.  Most of the large financial firms, e.g. JP Morgan, have traditionally 
conducted their outsourcing business via captives.  As demand contracts, Indian firms are 
apparently also being asked by buyers to reduce prices.  The ensuing margin squeeze is likely 
to be greater in IT services where a larger portion of projects is conducted as arms-length 
trade. 
  14In contrast to the negative effects of the recession, IT and BPO exporters may stand to gain 
from the current crisis as firms in industrialized countries are under increased pressure to cut 
costs.  The financial dimensions of the crisis seems to have increased demand for certain 
types of outsourced tasks, such as legal process outsourcing or activities related to debt 
processing. But in general cost pressures have so far tended to manifest themselves in greater 
demand for outsourcing in core BPO areas rather than to entice companies to venture into 
new “context” areas in which outsourcing has been less common.  In traditional BPO areas, 
outsourcing options are being pursued more vigorously both with captive firms and at arms-
length.  There has also been a discernable acceleration in the speed with which outsourcing 
decisions are being taken. While decisions were being taken within 9-12 months before the 
crisis, the decision time has now shrunk to 6 months.  
The impact of parental distress in sectors such as finance and automobiles is less clear.  
Industry officials indicate that an increased quantum of work is being done offshore in 
banking.  But the impact is not uniform across firms.  For example, in insurance, while AIG 
may have reduced the amount of outsourcing, AXA has not. In the automotive industry, 
outsourcing has been significantly reduced (by some 50%) as many operations, e.g. warranty 
claims or customer care, are discretionary.  Thus, experiences of, and choices made by, one 
firm are not necessarily representative of the industry at large. 
 
 
III.2 Impact  on  Employment 
The Indian IT and ITES sectors directly employ some 2.2 million people, of which 1.7 
million are associated with services exports.  The number of people indirectly employed – 
i.e. providing auxiliary services - is a factor of 3.5 to 4 greater than the directly employed, or 
an estimated 7-8 million.  As in the case of revenues, the employment effects of the crisis 
largely take the form of reductions in growth rates, rather than layoffs, and a more intensive 
use of the existing workforce.   
The latter effect leads to growth in employment being more muted than growth in sales. In 
2009, while sales are still expected to grow by a rate in excess of 10%, employment is 
projected to expand by 5-6%.  As noted above, cast in absolute numbers this means that 
around 100-110,000 new jobs will be created in 2009 (in comparison: 223,000 jobs were 
created in 2008).  According to industry estimates, in the absence of the current crises a 
counterfactual 160,000 jobs would conceivably have been added, thus the employment dent 
left by the financial crisis amounts to about one-third of new jobs not created.  There has 
always been a high level of attrition in the industry and companies are using the crisis to 
more aggressively “cull” non-performers.  
This assessment provides us with some sense of direct employment effects.  However, it is 
hard to assess the impact on indirect employment upstream business, e.g. in the upstream 
education sector that caters to the Indian services exports industry.  These figures should, 
therefore, be viewed as a rather conservative lower bound. 
At the same time, companies are seeking to maximize the utilization of their currently 
employed labor force through at least two channels.  First, firms are pushing up utilization of 
their existing labor force, e.g. by eliminating reserves such as the 12-18% of labor-time that 
previously lay idle (workers were not engaged in billable activity but waiting to be 
  15employed). This reserve has now come down to 5-8%.  Steps such as cutting breaks between 
login and logout have led to a further increase in productivity of about 6-8%.  Second, there 
is a shift in the service line portfolio towards higher value added services, which likewise 
leads to increased labor productivity.  In general, the Indian workforce is relatively young 
and skilled  - the average age of an Infosys worker is 26 and most have engineering degrees.   
Workers are reported to exhibit a high degree of adaptability and flexibility in the crisis, 
reflected for example in the willingness to work on multiple tasks for longer hours. 
 
 
III.3  Limited Dependence on External Finance 
The previous section suggests that the unfolding financial crisis affects Indian services 
exporters through adverse demand shocks. In stark contrast to the manufacturing sector, 
tightening credit conditions are not constraining the production and export of services, for 
three reasons.  First, the fact that many services are delivered electronically across borders, as 
digitized products, and occasionally through the movement of individuals to provide 
consulting onsite, obviates the need for traditional trade finance, the deteriorating availability 
of which has hurt goods trade.   
Secondly, to the extent that external funds are needed, advance payments and factoring 
continue to help meet financing needs.  The former is important in an industry that produces 
customized products with significant relationship-specific investments by the service 
supplier.  The latter instrument is available to small and large firms alike, even though the 
discount margins for large firms may be smaller.  Even before turning receivables into cash, 
many Indian IT firms are able to leverage contracts in order to pre-finance working capital at 
the time when the order is placed provided the contract involves a recognized party or 
government. 
Importantly, receivables in the BPO industry are fungible and easily factorized because they 
typically involve a short-term transaction, a buyer who is highly creditworthy, and disputes 
over the service rendered are rare.  The latter feature makes the receivables a negotiable, 
irrevocable instrument that is detached from the underlying transaction.  Since factoring as a 
trade credit instrument is on the rise, at least as compared to conventional documentary 
credit, reliance on this particular form of credit puts BPO services a step ahead of other 
sectors, notably manufacturing.  
The third reason for the sector’s tenacity is found in its relative independence from debt 
finance.  Indeed, the financial structure of IT and ITES firms is in general characterized by 
low leverage with little, if any, debt.  While access to external finance is of some importance, 
working capital is predominately financed by retained earnings or, for start-ups, through 
venture capital.   
A brief glance at Infosys, one of the largest BPO services exporters and a leader in the 
industry illustrates the point of minimal financial dependence.  With over 100,000 
employees, Infosys is debt-free.  On the cost side, software development expenses are the 
single most important item, eating up 57% of gross revenues, the overwhelming part of 
which consists of salaries.  In fact, services production involves few intermediate inputs so 
that 86% of revenue is value added.  It may seem that under these circumstances financing 
working capital poses quite a challenge as nothing tangible is produced that could be used as 
  16collateral.  But in the case of Infosys, internal cash flows are sufficient to cover working 
capital, capital expenditure, investment in subsidiaries, dividends, and still leave a surplus.  
While the excellent financial condition of Infosys might not be fully representative, Tata 
Consultancy Services (TCS), another large BPO supplier, likewise does not carry any debt on 
its balance sheet.  At the same time, a fair amount of venture capital (some $500m) seems to 
be available for nascent firms 
It seems likely that the low dependence on debt finance—which works to the benefit of 
services firms at a time when sources of external credit dry up—is the result of the fact that 
services producing firms have to stand on their own feet even in “normal” times.  Software 
development services, for instance, require potentially large upfront expenses which must be 
financed until payment can finally be collected, and in addition such products typically carry 
a high degree of uncertainty regarding future profits.  With no tangible collateral on hand, 
financing of working capital is a generic problem of services suppliers that existed well 
before the current credit crisis.  Developing a financial strategy that relies largely on retained 
earnings (or initially on venture capital) is a consequence of services providers’ inherent 
difficulty in accessing commercial credit.   
Overall, industry officials do not consider access to finance as a major concern for Indian 
services exporters.  The way the crisis is affecting the financial position of services suppliers 
is by potentially squeezing their margins. To the extent that the length of the working capital 
cycle is elongated, the cost of funds is increasing which in turn reduces margins.  
There is also evidence that the crisis has prompted some changes in payment patterns.  As a 
means of financing, advance payments used to be a common feature in the industry. 
Apparently, prior to the crisis hardly any firm providing IT and ITES would have considered 
an outsourcing project without a down payment.  The unfolding crisis and the associated 
slump in demand are eroding Indian exporters’ bargaining position so that some deferral of 
fees and invoices is increasingly observed. 
The relatively comfortable situation of IT and ITES exporters does not necessarily represent 
the situation of all services firms, as matters are highly specific to individual sectors.  Agents 
providing transportation services, for example, face more or less the same problems in the 
crisis as do manufacturing firms.  Quite apart from the slump in demand, freight charges are 
usually paid in advance and are financed as part of the trade credit package.  Therefore the 




Services industry sources in developing countries suggest that a bigger problem than any 
explicit restrictions is the general mood of protectionism emerging in crisis-hit countries.  
This mood has not produced visible restrictions but generated increasingly strong implicit 
political pressure to retain jobs domestically.  While the negative demand shock can to some 
extent be quantified, evaluating the effect of the incipient protectionist sentiment is harder.  
Consider two examples of explicit restrictions drawn from the United States, the market on 
which this paper has focused and which, because of its size and openness to cross-border 
trade in services, is of greatest significance to services exporters like India. 
  17In light of the Buy American provisions in recent US legislation, it is instructive to recall the 
history of past sub-federal initiatives that sought to promote onshore employment.  For 
instance, in the years 2001-02 New Jersey drafted legislation for preferential procurement, 
including stipulations that work was to be done by firms with US employees rather than 
firms that outsourced.  However, the bill was progressively diluted as it passed through the 
legislative process. To begin with, the Act would only apply to government funded projects, 
thereby excluding any private sector financed projects. Moreover, in case of a cost 
differential between potential providers exceeding a certain percentage (approximately 15-
20%) a waiver would be automatically granted. These modifications rendered the Act 
ultimately ineffectual, and the New Jersey experience seems to represent the fate of several 
similar legislative projects in other US states.  The apparent popularity of such measures 
notwithstanding, there appears to be a sizable US business constituency that would 
potentially be hurt by such measures, as reflected in the recent letter 150 US companies sent 
to President Obama in which they caution against the Buy American initiative.   
Contrast this experience with the following example of how firms’ choices are being 
influenced by the change in political mood.  On April 6, 2009, Sallie Mae, a company which 
manages $180 billion in education loans and has 10 million student and parent customers, 
announced plans to move 2,000 overseas jobs back to the United States from India and the 
Philippines, reversing a cost-savings measure the company took a year ago.
13  The company 
said it plans to fill jobs, including positions in call centers, information technology and 
operations, in the United States over the next 18 months. The projected cost is about $35 
million annually because of higher labor expenses.  The Sallie Mae chief executive Albert L. 
Lord was quoted as saying:  "It's the right thing to do.  The value of a company's franchise is 
essentially measured in financial terms, but there are a lot of values in a company that relate 
to the long-term value of a franchise. It's a wise investment in the company's future…It was a 
tough decision to move these jobs overseas. It was a lot easier to make the decision to bring 
them back." Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski (Democrat from Pennsylvania), who’s Wilkes-Barre 
district will receive 600 new Sallie Mae jobs was quoted as saying: “It's a patriotic act. It 
sends a great message to corporate America to think as deeply as you can." 
 
In addition to the changing political climate, a related concern is the widening boundary of 
the state as a result of increased government ownership of firms during the crisis.  The US 
Government has already spent $245 bn under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) to hold 
preferred stocks in more than 200 financial companies.  Particularly large investments have 
been made in the financial giants, Citigroup and Bank of America, under the Targeted 
Investment Program and Asset Guarantee Program, and on AIG under the Systemically 
Significant Failing Institutions Program.  General Motors and Chrysler have received $30 bn 
under the Automotive Industry Financing Program and the Automotive Supplier Support 
Program.  The worry, for which there is as yet no concrete basis, is that state ownership will 
induce a national bias in firms’ choices on procurement and location of economic activity.   
 
Another example of explicit restrictions is the provision in the recent US stimulus bill 
making it difficult for financial institutions that have received taxpayers’ funds to hire 
                                                 
13 SLM to Transfer Overseas Jobs to US: Reston Student Lender to Move 2,000 Workers Out of Asia, by 
Thomas Heath in the Washington Post, April 7, 2009. 
  18specialty occupation (H-1B) visa holders if they have recently made US workers redundant.  
Given the binding aggregate quota on H-1B visas, a restriction on employment in a particular 
sector probably has limited impact, other than on foreign workers with skills that are specific 
to the restricted sectors. Thus the restrictions on employing or contracting foreign services 
providers in specific areas (e.g. financial services) are not as costly for both host and source 
as the increasing social and political aversion to immigration of service providers and the 
possibility of retaliatory restrictions.  As Lloyd Blankfein, the chief executive of Goldman 
Sachs warned, the company had 200 people in the US on H-1B visas but also 2000 
employees who worked overseas but paid US taxes; the latter could be the target of 
retaliatory measures by other governments.
14   
 
Finally, in the longer term, subsidies to banks are probably less damaging than financial 
protectionism.
15  The former are temporarily necessary to ensure the stability of the financial 
system.  The latter seriously erode the case for openness.  Inducing national banks to lend 
domestically in a crisis deprives developing countries in particular of capital when they most 





Using new trade data from the United States, we show that services trade is weathering the 
current crisis much better than goods trade.  The currently available evidence from other 
OECD countries does not contradict this picture.  Particularly striking is the continued 
growth of trade in a range of business, professional, and technical services.  We find that 
developing countries like India, which are relatively specialized in business process 
outsourcing and information technology services, have suffered much smaller declines in 
total exports to the United States than countries like Brazil and China and regions like Africa 
which are specialized in exports of goods, transport services or tourism services. 
 
A key area for future research is to understand the reasons for the resilience of services trade.  
One possibility is that this resilience reflects delayed adjustment, both domestically and 
internationally.  While some services industries like construction are affected more quickly in 
a recession, other services industries tend to adjust more slowly.
16  Alternatively, as we have 
conjectured, resilience could be a consequence of certain features of services or services 
trade itself:  demand for a range of traded services is less cyclical, and services trade and 
production are less dependent on external finance. We clearly need more thorough 
investigation of these hypotheses.  
 
We have also argued that even though few protectionist measures have so far been taken in 
services, the growing political and social aversion to outsourcing is a threat to trade.  This 
                                                 
14 Francesco Guerrera, “Blankfein attacks bankers’ pay,” Financial Times, April 8, 2009. 
15 See, for example, Anthony Faiola and Mary Jordan, “British Bank To the World Takes Its Cash Back Home: 
Battered RBS Caught In Protectionist Storm,” Washington Post, March 28, 2009. 
16 See, for example, Jiang et al. (2009).  It is also possible that payment for services occurs with a lag so that 
slackening demand is only gradually reflected in measured payments.  
  19aversion is obscuring the economic stake that all countries have in open global services 
markets.  While developing countries like India have seen rapid export growth, by far the 
largest exporters of these services are the US and the countries of the European Union.  The 
EU and US account for 65 percent of world services exports; China and India for 6 percent.
17  
The US and EU have both consistently run a huge annual surplus on services trade, currently 
nearly $160 billion for the US and $220 billion for the EU countries.  While US services 
imports from India and China have indeed grown to around $22 billion in 2008, US exports 
to these countries have expanded even faster, to over $26 billion.  Even during the crisis US 
exports of key services are growing faster than its imports. 
 
The US and EU have been powerful advocates of open services markets all over the world.  
Many developing countries have begun to reform their markets for communications, 
transport, financial, distribution and other business services.  A retreat from openness in 
services in industrial countries could undermine reform efforts in developing countries, and 
even trigger a costly spiral of retaliatory protection.   
                                                 
17 Data in this paragraph is from the World Trade Organization. 
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  21Annex 1:  Longer Term Trends in Global Services Trade 
 
Cross-border exports of commercial services account for around 20 percent of overall global 
exports in both goods and services.  Figure A.1 shows that over the last decade the share of 
services in worldwide exports has been fairly constant for most countries.  This development 
masks interesting differences across countries and regions.  Most notably, the share of 
services has been steadily increasing in India, particularly since 2003, but has been 
decreasing for Africa and China.   
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Source: World Trade Organization, Total Merchandise Trade and Trade in 
Commercial Services Statistics.  Services trade data for 2008 is not available for 
China and India. 
 
In terms of countries’ shares in global services trade, there has not been much change over 
the past decade.  As Figure A.2 shows, Europe accounts for about 50 percent of global 
services imports, followed by Asia with about 25 percent and the US with some 10 percent. 
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Source: World Trade Organization, Trade in Commercial Services Statistics. 
 
As far as shares in global exports are concerned, the US and EU lead the world (Figure A.3).  
Together they account for 65 percent of world services exports.  In 2007 China and India 
jointly accounted for only about 6 percent.   
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Source: World Trade Organization, Trade in Commercial Services Statistics.  Services 
trade data for 2008 is not available for China and India. 
 
  23Annex 2:  Composition of Goods and Services Imports of the US 
 
The panels in Figure A.4 and Table A.1 show the development over time of goods and 
services imports by the United States from selected source countries or regions.  Services 
flows are broken down into travel, transportation services and other private services.  The pie 
charts on the left show shares and the time series charts on the right show growth rates.  It 
can be seen that imports of goods and transportation services decline sharply in the fourth 
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Source: BEA, US International Transactions Accounts Data, Tab.12: US International Transactions by Area, 














  26Table A.1:  Shares of Services and Private Services in Total Trade (Third Quarter 2008) and 
Growth Rates of Goods and Services (Fourth Quarter 2008)  
 




















HKG 49.1  14.5 -18.05 -8.32 55.77  -0.76
GBR 43.9  22.6 -18.46 -19.4 -44.48  -0.62
AUS 36.4  19.3 -20.16 -0.85 23.37  -6.14
NLD 31.6  13.3 -10.57 -18.63 -26  -0.09
IND 30.7  24.1 -7.16 -35.05 70.15  1.46
Europe 29.1  11.7 -13.57 -20.99 -42.83  -0.41
FRA 28  8 -4.11 -27.39 -41.48  -0.81
SGP 26.7  11.2 -10.57 -5.84 11  1.66
GER 26.7  8.3 -8.69 -21.99 -33.48  0.43
ITA 21.5  4.4 -14.41 -23.19 -49.06  -9.11
ARG 20.4  7.7 2.85 -1.49 27.04  -3.5
BEL 19.2  10.8 -15.08 -8.33 -37.04  8.63
KOR 17.5  1.7 -10.18 -15.18 -27.22  -1.15
TWN 16.6  1.6 -11.39 -4.4 4.98  -0.55
JPN 16.5  3.6 -8.27 -8.73 -9.47  -0.07
MiddleEast 14.1 1.6 -37.13 -19.39 -13.16  4.43
BRA 13.9  8.5 -15.24 -9.27 -10.37  5.29
ZAF 13.3  5.9 -31.79 -1.3 -32.65  -1.04
AsiaPac 11.4  3.6 -9.71 -8.78 14.02  0.04
SCAmerica 8.8  2.3 -20.96 -1.79 -7.38  -1.34
CAN 7.5  2.8 -22.36 -14.31 -62.8  -1.47
MEX 6.4  1.4 -12.85 -22.8 3.87  -2.15
Africa 5.3  2 -38 -16.61 -25.15  -3.55
CHN 2.6  0.8 -9.13 -10.91 10.35  1.48
VEN 1.2  0.3 -46.88 1.25 18.67  -1.96
    
Mean 19.94  7.68 -16.4748 -12.9476 -8.934  -0.452
 
Source: BEA, US International Transactions Accounts Data, Tab.12: US International Transactions by Area, 
millions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted.  
Notes:  Country entries are sorted by decreasing share of all services in their total exports.  The second and third 
column contain the shares of total and other private services, respectively, in a country’s total exports (goods 
and services) to the US in the third quarter of 2008.  Growth rates in columns 4-7 are percentage changes 
between the fourth and third quarter 2008.   
  27Figure A.5:  Change in the Value and Growth Rates of Exports to the US and Share of Other 
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Source: BEA, US International Transactions Accounts Data, Tab.12: US International 
Transactions by Area, millions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted. The slope 
coefficients in the graphs are significant at the 5 percent level. 
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